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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-Limitations on Price Fixing Legislation.-The de-
fendant was convicted of a violation of the "Fair Sales Act" which pro-
hibited the sale of a commodity at less than the cost price. The defendant
admittedly advertised "loss leaders" (name products advertised at less than cost
price) to attract customers to his store. His intention was merely to promote
the sale of other products at a normal profit ratio. The proponents of the act
justified the restriction on the grounds that many retailers used the device of
"loss leaders" fraudulently. Known products were advertised at an exceptionally
low price. Customers, however, were never able to purchase them at that low
price. They were invariably told that the advertised product was sold out, but
that there was available a substitute at a slightly higher price. The defendant
attacked the statute on the ground that it was a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On appeal, it was held that the "Fair Sales Act" was an unconstitutional
attempt to fix prices upon goods not affected with a public interest. State v.
Packard, Bramberger & Co. (New Jersey 1939) 2 A. (2d) 599.
A problem, closely akin to the one treated in the foregoing case, arose in
People v. Victor (Mich. 1939) 283 N.W. 666. A gasoline dealer was prosecuted
for a violation of a statute prohibiting vendors of bakery and petroleum prod-
ucts from giving away one commodity to promote the sale of another. The
defendant had offered a glass worth less than five cents to each purchaser of
five gallons of gasoline. The statute was held to be in violation of the due
process clause in that it attempted to fix prices of commodities which did not
affect the public welfare, health, morals, or safety.
Numerous statutes prohibiting merchants from distributing redeemable
stamps to their customers, a transaction very similar in purpose to 'the one in
the foregoing case, have been sustained. In Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240
U.S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L.ed. 679 (1915) ; a Florida statute imposed a prac-
tically prohibitive license fee on all merchants using redeemable stamps or simi-
lar devices in connection with the sale of their merchandise. The statute was
attacked as an illegitimate price fixing statute. The court, however, held it legiti-
mate on the ground that it sought to protect public morals and welfare; that
the offer of premiums was "an appeal to cupidity to lure improvidence," though
not "gaming it may, however, be considered as having the seduction and evil of
such."
The right of an owner to fix the price at which his property is to be sold
has almost universally been recognized as one of the inherent attributes of
property ownership protected by the fourteenth Amendment. Case of The State
Freight Tax, 15 Wall. (82 U.S.) 232, 21 Led. 146 (1866); Tyson & Bros.
United Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.ed. 718 (1927).
The Supreme Court, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.ed. 77 (1876) pointed
out that neither the rights of property nor of contract are absolute; that there
is reserved in the government, by immemorial tradition, the power to regulate
certain businesses such as innkeepers; that, by implication, there is vested in
the public an interest in certain types of businesses affecting the public welfare;
and that therefore there is impliedly granted to the public the power to regulate
these businesses. In the Munn case a statute fixing the rates which warehouses
within the state of Illinois might charge for the storage of grain was upheld
on the ground that the business was affected with a public interest. Under the
circumstances these warehouses were "the gateways of commerce" in grain
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between the east and the west, and were therefore of such great domestic con-
cern that they were in effect devoted to public use.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L.ed. 1103 (1923) designated three types of businesses which
might be clothed with a public interest: (1) Those conducted upon the authority
of a public grant which expressly or impliedily imposed a duty to render services
to the public, i.e. the common carrier; (2) Certain occupations wherein the pub-
lic interest has been traditionally recognized, i.e. the inn keeper; (3) Those
businesses which, because of their peculiar relation to the public, have, in effect,
devoted their resources to public use.
Whether or not a business is in fact affected with a public interest is a
matter that must be determined by a judicial inquiry. Property is not clothed
with a public interest merely because it is used in the manufacture of com-
modities for general use. In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
supra, the court refused to uphold a Kansas statute which declared that the
manufacture and preparation of food for human consumption, the manufacture
of clothing for human wear, the production of any substance in common use for
fuel, public utilities, and common carriers were businesses affected with a pub-
lic interest. It held that the mere declaration by the legislature that a business
is affected with a public interest is not conclusive. The statute in question
attempted to authorize a Court of Industrial Relations to fix wages and other
terms for the conduct of business, if the court found that labor disputes in the
enumerated businesses affected public health. This was declared a violation of
the due process clause and therefore an unconstitutional attempt to regulate
private enterprise.
A New York statute prohibiting the resale of tickets to places of public
entertainment at an enhanced price was held to be a violation of the fourteenth
Amendment. The theatrical business and the sale of theater tickets was held not
to be of such public interest as would authorize the legislature to regulate the
prices at which tickets were to be sold. Tyson & Bros. United Ticket Offices v.
Bantog, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct 426, 71 L.ed. 718 (1927).
Numerous attempts have been made to utilize price fixing statutes as a means
of preserving and protecting the dominant industries of the state. While such
laws, under certain circumstances, may be justified under the police powers of the
state, the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution cannot be circumvented
merely to accomplish what might appear to be a good end. In Fairmont Creamery
Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 147 Sup. Ct. 506, 71 L.ed. 893 (1927), the court held
unconstitutional a law prohibiting manufacturers and distributors of dairy prod-
ucts from paying more for dairy products in one community than in others,
allowing of course for the reasonable cost of transportation. Though the dairy
industry was the predominant industry of the state, and though the regulations
passed were intended to promote and protect that industry by preventing certain
large concerns from wiping out their smaller competitors by creating a monopoly,
the court held that the industry was a private one not vested with a public inter-
est and therefore not subject to regulation.
The court came to a somewhat different conclusion in the Central Lumber Co.
v. State of South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66, 57 L.ed. 164 (1912). The
statute in question provided that anyone engaged in the production of commodi-
ties for general consumption was prohibited from selling his product at a lower
price to one retailer than to another in the same community with the intentional
object of preventing competition. The milk case may be distinguished from the
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lumber case in that the former deals with purchases by manufacturers, while
the latter case deals with the sales to retailers. The court interprets statutes
attacking monopolies by regulating the sale price of goods as being directed
towards the protection of the purchaser. Hence statutes of this nature may be
sustained under the police powers of the state, whereas statutes similar in pur-
pose, but operating through the regulation of the purchase price paid by the
manufacturer, cannot be sustained because their effect upon the general wel-
fare of the people is regarded as too indirect.
Attempts have been made to interpret Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54
Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L.ed. 940 (1933) as an alteration of the established rule limiting
the powers of -price fixing. The statute contested in the latter case sought to
terminate a price war between local stores and the large distributors of milk.
The large distributors had a greater overhead and purchased the milk at a
higher price, and therefore necessarily had to maintain the standard price of
milk. The smaller stores were able to purchase the milk at an exceptionally low
price because they had the opportunity to buy the surplus milk not included in
the contracts with the larger distributors. The farmer was willing to sell at a
loss because this surplus would otherwise have had to be discarded. To remedy
this situation the state board set a minimum price for milk and provided a
penalty for those who sold under the established price. The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction of a retailer under the statute. This case, however, does
not establish any broad legislative power to fix prices. The act was emergency
legislation limited in time, and dealt only with a single industry. And in fact,
that industry was, under the circumstances, vitally affected with a public interest.
Following the authority of the Nebbia Milk Case, a "Milk Control Act!' was
declared a constitutional exercise of the police power. The Act authorized a
milk board to regulate the prices at which milk was to be sold, and to further
regulate and supervise the milk industry. The price was to be based upon a
consideration of "the balance between production and consumption of milk, the
costs of production and distribution, and the purchasing power of the public,
and the amount necessary to yield a reasonable return to the producer and milk
dealer." The court pointed out that, "Changing conditions necessarily impose a
greater demand upon this reserve power (police power) . . . The economic in-
terests of the state may justify its exercise, notwithstanding that the expedient
resorted to invades the domain of property rights or of contract. The Consti-
tution does not secure to any one the liberty to conduct his business in such
a fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large or upon a substantial
group of the people." State v. Auclair (Vt. 1939) 4 A. (2d) 107.
What may be the beginning of a new philosophy giving impetus to a more
extensive governmental paternalism over business may be found in the dissent
of the New State Ice Co. v. Liebmnann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.ed. 747
(1932). That case held that a law requiring a certificate of necessity as a condi-
tion precedent to the right of entering the ice business in the State of Oklahoma
was unconstitutional, because it was an attempt to regulate private enterprise.
Justice Brandeis, in voicing his dissent, said, "In my opinion, the true principle
is that the State's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably
required and appropriate for public protection." While not any of the recent
decisions have gone so far as to sustain a regulation merely because it was
"reasonably required, and appropriate for public protection," the growth in
number of the many new codes seems to indicate a tendency towards an in-
creased governmental regulation. In State v. McCasters (Minn. 1939) 283 N.W.
[Vol. 23
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767, the court sustained a barber's code on the ground that it was a trade
affected with a public interest. Yet in the same opinion the court said, "The
main objective, somewhat disguised, is the welfare of the trade rendering the
services. The general public interest if any, is indirect and incidental." Similar
codes were sustained in Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977 (1938) ;
Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938). Such
codes were declared unconstitutional in: City of Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App.
344, 173 So. 254 (1937); Ex parte Kansas, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 161, 70 P. (2d)
962 (1937) ; State v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
DANiEL C. SHEA.
Contracts-Consideration-Accord and Satisfaction of a liquidated Debt.-
An indorsee brought action on a note. The defendant maker pleaded dis-
charge by virtue of a three-party agreement under which the plaintiff had
acquired the note from the former holder. This agreement had been fully exe-
cuted. Under it the former holder received from the plaintiff an automobile
worth $250. The plaintiff received from the defendant livestock and produce
worth $250, and the defendant paid the license fee on the automobile. At the
time of the agreement the defendant was hopelessly insolvent. The trial court
directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that "a mere promise of the
debtor to pay a sum less than the debt in full satisfaction of it is without con-
sideration and binds neither party." Rye v. Phillips (Minn. 1938) 282 N.W. 459.
The Minnesota Supreme Court characterized the doctrine invoked by the
plaintiff as a relic "of antique law which should have been discarded long ago"
and as evidence of the capacity of lawyers "to make the requirement of con-
sideration an overworked shibboleth rather than a logical and just standard of
actionability." There is no reason, said the court, why a person should be pre-
vented from making an executed gift of incorporeal as well as corporeal prop-
erty. But the decision was ultimately based on the fact that "the new tripartite
contract pleaded had plenty of consideration."
The common law doctrine, that a past due, liquidated debt can not be dis-
charged by payment of a lesser sum, is one that has provoked much opposition.
At least ten states have changed it by statute: Alabama, California, South
Dakota, Georgia, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee,
Virginia. WMIusToN, CoNMAcrs (2d ed. 1936) § 120, n. 9.
Iowa has long accepted part payment from an insolvent debtor in full satis-
faction. Engbretson v. Seiverling, 122 Iowa 522, 98 N.W. 319 (1904). In a Kan-
sas case a defendant was indebted to plaintiff bank for the sum of $1370 cov-
ered by two notes, one for $870 and the other for $500. Defendant, being unable
to feed the stock mortgaged to secure the first note, entered into an agreement
whereby payee bank agreed to accept the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged
livestock in full settlement providing that defendant did not go into bank-
ruptcy. The sale netted $515, for which payee returned the note for $870, but
brought suit on the other. It was held that the debtor's agreement not to enter
bankruptcy was sufficient consideration to support creditor's promise to accept
the proceeds of the sale in full payment of both notes. The court stated that any
possible loss or inconvenience to the one or benefit to the other was enough
to sustain the agreement extinguishing the debt by a smaller sum. Hall v.
Szindell, 147 Kan. 382, 76 P. (2d) 769 (1938).
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